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Presenter: Vinod Aggarwal
Responder: Robert Gilpin 
Presider: William Grimes 
Vinod Aggarwal
This idea of competitive liberalization is quite popular, in a variety of
modes, whether with sectoralism or regionalism or bilateralism or interregional-
ism. Sectoralism is where you move forward on a sectoral basis, such as with the
information technology agreement, basic telecom agreement, and so on, that we
have seen negotiated in the last few years. Regionalism is what everybody wor-
ries about. “We’re going to have a fortress Europe, a fortress America, a fortress
Asia...” and maybe regionalism will dominate and other things will be subordi-
nate. Then there is a fourth option, where there is some combination of global-
ism, regionalism, and sectoralism.
I distinguish between unilateral, bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral
accords, and then divide things up between agreements involving few products
or many products, then also whether the agreements between countries are geo-
graphically concentrated or geographically dispersed. They are also classified as
either protectionist arrangements or liberalizing arrangements. Why these dif-
ferent kinds of agreements, and how are they likely to evolve? And how do they
fit together? In Washington, I always hear, “Bilateralism was great. Look at the
19th century. It led to free trade.” To look back at the 19th century and say, “This
has all worked out well, let’s proceed with this,” is potentially the misuse of
history. 
Let’s look at another approach, which concerns liberalizing, not protection-
ist, arrangements. These were developed in ’96, ’98, and ’99, respectively, and
many people said that this was the way to go and nicely fit the “bicycle theory” of
trade among economists; that is, if you don’t keep moving forward, you fall off
your bicycle. Therefore, liberalization is good all the time, and it doesn’t matter
what form it takes. I suggest this is wrong. From a systemic perspective, it nar-
rows the number of issues. You may liberalize the strategic industries, but the
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downside is that these may be in conflict with the WTO in spirit, and from an
economic perspective, liberalism encourages investment in protected industries.
So you liberalize in one, but then capital flows into protected industries because
there are benefits to them because they get protection. We haven’t bought off the
losers; we have bought off the winners, ironically, and so, in fact, it makes it
more difficult to move forward, bicycle theory notwithstanding. I think this
vision is wrong.
The question is: Why do you get minilateral regional liberalization? What
are some of the systemic reasons? At the domestic level, again, it may be politi-
cally easier to get a regional agreement, but I argue it may harm future efforts to
gain support for broad-scale liberalization. What are some of the systemic rea-
sons for these agreements? There may be competition to link up. There may be
power asymmetries and it may help bolster them, but it may leave out weak
regions. Who is running to link up to poor regions? If you ask the EU why they
are doing this, their explanation is always this last one, which I’m skeptical of.
They always say, “We want the world to look like us. We have been very success-
ful in going from Coal and Steel Community to EEC to EU, therefore we want the
rest of the world to look like regions. Then we link up with them and everything
will be fine, unlike the American way, which is not very effective. We therefore
are trying to create groupings in our own image.” It is kind of an ideological cog-
nitive-driven model, as opposed to power-based or economic-based or lobbying by
corporations and the like.
The last type of arrangement is bilateral arrangements. We have seen 90 to
100 agreements in the last five years. One of the reasons: countries can exert
power through bilateralism much more than regionalism and interregionalism.
It is quite clear that if you are negotiating with a powerful country like the US,
EU, Japan, China, you will do anything to get market access. Small, developing
countries will essentially give up whatever they can or whatever they need to,
just to have guaranteed market access. Of course, that is a fleeting asset,
because as soon as the next agreement is negotiated with a neighbor, invest-
ments move away from that grouping and, therefore, they lose out. 
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I am going to deal with three aspects. One is the effect of regionalism on
economic welfare, otherwise known as economic development. The second is the
determinants of inequality in the contemporary world. The third is the role of
political factors, especially in shaping the international economy or division of
labor. 
Economists did not pursue the question of economic unification much,
because they assumed that any move toward economic unification was a positive
move. We are moving the world toward free markets. That’s good. This whole sub-
ject was transformed by Jacob Viner in a book called The Customs Union Issue.
He said that economic integration can be either trade creating or trade diverting.
It means that rather than a European country trading with a country outside
Europe, it is instead trading with a country within Europe; that is trade divert-
ing. For an economist, that’s bad because it is contrary to the whole notion of
efficiency. 
The second view in economics is focused on the question of an optimum cur-
rency area. What would be the optimum size of regionalization? There was a big
debate over this regarding European monetary unification, and it is yet to be
determined whether or not Europe is an optimum currency area. If you had one
monetary policy that benefits Germany, will that same policy benefit Greece or
Spain? 
The third thing that economists have focused on and argued is that eco-
nomic growth tends to create inequalities. It is inherent in the nature of eco-
nomic growth because it initially tends to benefit certain groups or regions of
the country. For example, the seaboard of China is benefiting, but the rest of
China is out of the game. If the country does not take on redistributive policies
to help those regions that aren’t gaining as much, then there is going to be a lot
of political friction within a society. Opening your borders is going to change
your economy. There is going to be shifting of division of labor within a country.
The second body of literature is on political economy, mixing politics into
these economic arrangements. Political economists tend to fall into three camps.
The liberal view is that there is a force in history moving toward an open global-
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ized world economy. This is what you find in Adam Smith. The second position is
Marxist, although a lot of people do not use the Marxist language. But their
argument is that political and economic unification comes about because of the
pressures of the capitalist class that wants to expand its market, its base, and
increase its profits. Everything is driven by economics. The third position is that
you have to introduce the political conflicts among nations and groups.
Economics is always subordinate, and the driving force in the world is security
or political expansion. This is a universal pattern. I cannot think of a single
example where economics propelled politics.
The Europeans are trying to do it the other way around, which has never
been done. Monetary and economic union will precede and lead to political
union. This only happens when the dominant powers see these economic
arrangements are in their interests. The EU would work much better if the Soviet
Union still existed.
In the future, I would be worried about these three things. Increasing
regionalization of the world will be based on and determined by the great pow-
ers, with a lot of conflict over it, in part because economic growth creates
inequalities. There is going to be much greater economic conflict among the
states. I do believe that this can be ameliorated. But that will require American
leadership and American cooperation with the other major industrial powers.
Unfortunately, the United States is part of the problem, not the solution. 
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S E S S I O N  T W O
Presenter: Lawrence Katzenstein
Responder: John Gerring 
Presider: Walter Connor 
Walter Connor
It is remarked that cultural factors either favor or inhibit economic develop-
ment. Was that true, to a significant extent, in the past? Will that be true in the
future? Will it be equally true of human development? What choices have to be
made by societies in which cultural biases do not, to the maximum extent,
encourage economic or human development? What options will such societies
have? Should parallels be drawn to the effect of political and governmental fac-
tors on development? I just have to say that this evokes one thought for me, and
it has to do with the ongoing, continuing reorganization—and maybe hyper-
organization—of Europe. For most of its existence, the EU has been a club of
Northwest and Western Europe, a club whose religious basis is all tied up in
Western Christianity and the conflict between, and then the coexistence of,
Protestantism and Latin Catholicism, with the one exception of the addition of
Greece. What is happening with the eight-country expansion into the former
Soviet bloc is that only countries that basically carry this Western culture, even
after Communism, are being added. And is it not to a degree about religion and
culture, more broadly, that the issue of whether Turkey is ever going to be able to
enter the EU comes in? 
Lawrence Katzenstein
I will discuss the question of a relationship between culture, economic
development, and human development. Particularly, one of the key questions is
whether culture encourages or discourages development. Frequently, culture is
used as a residual category that people draw explanations from if they can’t fig-
ure out what else is going on. Clifford Geertz says that culture is a set of shared
public meanings that offer templates, or toolkits, or recipes on how to live suc-
cessfully. He compares myths and the symbols that compose myths, which are
reinforced by rituals, which help ground members of the culture in the meanings
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and practice of everyday life. The thing that makes symbols work is that they are
ambiguous and multi-vocal. They therefore appeal to a broad population and, in
effect, keep peace and harmony within a broad population. We regard them as
the reality of everyday life, and we use them like they are part of reality. But what
they are is a set of shared social meanings that determine our reality to some
extent.
The nice thing about the symbolic approach is that it is not static. We don’t
know where values come from and how they change. The symbolic approach
allows us to look at how meanings change. Very often, if material society
changes, and particularly if a new generation is coming along that can’t find
jobs, or that group feels disaffected, then they might change the meanings of
symbols in society and alter them so that the new meanings will become part of
the corpus of ideas in that society. 
It seems to me that nation-states and societies that are most adaptive under
varied conditions have the capability of coming up with solutions that work to
increase their economic well-being and are adaptive in terms of being able to sell
it politically, so that the society buys into it. We have found some of the most
adaptive cultures for meeting economic challenges in the United States and
Japan. What both have in common is that they are at the periphery of cultural
systems, rather than at the center of cultural systems. They were used to looking
elsewhere, whether it was to Europe or to China, and it was then easy for them to
adapt new things when the need came along. 
Japan was at the periphery of the Confucian system, and yet it was able to
drop that system and its occupational classes when necessary during the Meiji
Restoration. Japan then went out to the rest of the world, as many of us know,
and adopted the best institutions it could. The Japanese took the best of what
they saw, and in doing so were able to create these institutions and adapt them
to their culture. They were also able to motivate their people to work toward
these goals by saying, “Look at all these other countries. It is shameful that we’re
down here,” and invoking hierarchical themes that would sell well in their own
society, saying, “We’re down at the bottom. We should be ashamed of ourselves.
We should be able to compete with the West.” After World War II, Japan was able
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to adapt to the new realities of the world and grow once again into one of the
major leading economic powers of the world. 
I will leave you with the thought that societies that are not able to develop
an adaptive framework are rigid; cultures that don’t allow adaptation work to the
disadvantage of both their economic and social growth. 
John Gerring
I believe it was Harry Eckstein who said that trying to study culture was like
trying to nail Jell-O to a wall, and it is kind of a nice entrée into this subject. A
sort of a sign of the times is that things we used to label as culture we now label
as institutions. I think the benefit of a term like “institutions” is that it gives us
a sense of causal agency when we are trying to identify a causal factor. In the
area of human development, it has now become quite standard to include some
kind of measure of Islam, because this is correlated with high illiteracy, particu-
larly among women, and with high fertility rates and high infant mortality. We
generally interpret Islam as having some cultural components, although what’s
culture and what’s not is really an open question. 
With respect to the provocative arguments about cultures of adaptation ver-
sus cultures of orthodoxy, part of me also wonders, well, is it adaptation or open-
ness? Is it cultures that basically just roll over and die? I’m thinking particularly
of Japan, which has managed to maintain a lot of its traditional features and
nonetheless is one of the most outstanding successes. Modernization clearly has
something to do with combining the traditional with the modern. The United
States is perhaps the most forward-looking when it comes to questions of mar-
kets and capitalist development, and one of the most orthodox, backward-look-
ing status quo countries in the world when it comes to questions of politics and
religion and lifestyle. 
Culture has been around for a long time as a kind of explanatory category,
but I don’t think we’ve really done a very good job of bringing to bear the tools of
social science on this very difficult question. I think that, just empirically, what’s
going to happen is that we’re going to get more and more cross-national polls,
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and the quality of those polls is going to improve. You can see this in the World
Values Survey. This will allow us to have more of an empirical handle on how
countries actually differ and how they change through time. 
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S E S S I O N  T H R E E
Presenter: Abhijit Banerjee 
Responder: John Harris 
Presider: James Dewar 
Abhijit Banerjee
For 50 years, economists have sought to assure themselves and others that
faster growth will not come at the expense of more misery for the poor. While
there may be some transitional phase, once we really get into growth, it will
redeem us all. There are three parables that economists tell, each of which ends
with a related but not identical message. 
The first is the trade parable. Once there was a poor country, and, when it
discovered trade, there was growth. Trade is wonderful, because it allows the
country to sell what the country is best at to the whole world. So you are good at
something and you sell it to everybody. Unfortunately, all the recent evidence
suggests that when poor countries open up to trade, inequality goes up or stays
the same. The poor countries do not benefit more than others. If anything, they
benefit less than the rest. The problem seems to be that in these countries, the
sectors that gain from trade don’t necessarily expand very fast because markets
in these countries don’t work very well. The sectors that should grow because of
trade don’t grow very much. As a result, poor countries end up sometimes paying
the cost of the shrinking and not getting the benefit of the expansion. Expansion
takes time and requires resources to be shifted. 
A different story is attributed to Simon Kuznets, who was a Nobel Prize win-
ner in economics in 1957. Once there was a poor country where everyone lived in
a village. Everyone was poor, but equal. Then one day, there was a new road to the
city, and in the city there were opportunities. So some people went to the city and
got rich. But some people stayed back in the village, so there was inequality.
When everyone had moved to the city, they were all equal again and they were all
rich. You paid with some inequality along the path, but once you got where you
wanted to get to, everybody was rich and equal. Average income and inequality
should have an inverted U-shape relationship. The inequality is a growing pain in
this world. 
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Alas, the countries for which data became available after Kuznets’s study
just didn’t behave. In other countries, we see a U shape that goes the other way.
Inequality first goes down and then goes up. Anything else in between has been
found as well. Making matters worse, there are a bunch of people who have been
looking at what actually happened in these countries that Kuznets had been
studying. Contrary to Kuznets’s view, growth had very little to do with the fall of
inequality. It was driven entirely by other factors. Conversely, there are a variety
of reasons why these countries that started on the path to Kuznets’s paradise
didn’t get there.
The third parable is from my colleague, Bob Solow. Once there was a poor
country that set out to develop and found it could do better than all those rich
countries because it had unused manpower and resources. To be a poor country,
in Solow’s vision, is to be a country that hasn’t taken advantage of the resources
it has. Therefore, once it starts getting developed, it has all these resources sit-
ting around that it hasn’t taken advantage of, so it could really do well. Solow
argued that the return on capital in these countries should be very high; this will
encourage people to save and invest, so the country very soon will catch up or
almost catch up with the rich countries. However, it turns out that the return on
capital isn’t that much higher in poorer countries. Second, investment rates and
savings rates are actually lower in poorer countries, unlike what Solow hoped
for. Poorer countries absolutely do not grow faster than richer countries. There
is no assured redemption, no guarantee that the poor will benefit disproportion-
ately from growth. 
Many people give a new paradigm that growth is distribution-neutral.
Growth is neither bad for the poor nor good for the poor, so let us forget about
distribution and focus on growth. However, a sharp increase in inequality is not
something that leaves the growth process alone. A sharp increase in inequality
can affect the social compact. When some people get rich, other people get
angry. If the inequality is too large and if enough people feel completely excluded
from the process, that anger unleashes forces that might eventually stop growth.
To say that we are going to promote growth and that we don’t really know what
happens to inequality, so we’re going to ignore it, is somewhat hypocritical. We
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know exactly who will be hurt by a reduction in cotton tariffs. I think the most
important of these points is perhaps that sometimes we do understand what
goes wrong, and we can do something about it. So if we don’t worry about it, we
don’t worry because we don’t want to, and not because we can’t. 
So what can we do? Give people skills, health, education, all kinds of avail-
able opportunities that open up with growth. Provide the physical, legal, intellec-
tual infrastructure. I think the cost is actually constantly overestimated. India is
growing at 8 percent a year. At 8 percent a year, there is lots and lots of redistrib-
ution you can do.
The real issue here is the politics of those who cannot be bothered. That is
what really shows up in the discussions of growth vs. poverty alleviation; poverty
alleviation is not the enemy of growth, nor is growth the enemy of poverty allevi-
ation, but those who want to forget about poverty are the enemy of the poor. 
John Harris
Inequality and poverty are two somewhat different measures. Another
important set of concerns is what is happening to absolute living standards of
the poor. Indeed, the Human Development Index is basically a measure of levels
of life expectancy, infant mortality, education rates, etc. What happens more
often in growth is that the poor are generally getting a little bit richer. In many
societies, the rich are getting a lot richer, so that we’re increasing inequality, but
the absolute poverty level is decreasing. I think it is very useful to concentrate
particularly on the matter of what leads to reductions in absolute poverty. 
There are at least two countries that I have worked in recently that have
been relatively successful in terms of a reduction in poverty. One is Indonesia.
The other is Uganda.  What appeared to be the actions that led to these sharp
reductions in absolute poverty? If you take Indonesia, the poverty rates fell from
about 55–60 percent of the population in 1970 to less than 15 percent by 1995.
Again, we’re talking about a base of a couple of hundred million people, so these
are many millions of people whose absolute standards of living have been raised.
It has shown up in life expectancy, it has shown up in other health measures. All
the other kinds of quality-of-life indicators, at least with a material base, showed
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fairly similar improvements over a period of time. There are a series of policies
at work in Indonesia. One is a major program of providing limited amounts of
resources to local areas to hire landless people to do labor-intensive public works
programs in the slack seasons. The labor was used to increase the productive
assets in terms of feeder roads, of clearing tertiary canals, later of building
schools, of building health clinics, and a range of other activities. There was agri-
cultural intensification—basically rapid dissemination of Green Revolution-type
techniques in agriculture—and a relatively egalitarian distribution of land. This
was not a country with a very large dominant class of landholders. 
The other thing that had a huge impact was the opening up of sweatshops,
the opening up of trade to labor-intensive exports. The decrease in absolute
poverty levels corresponds directly to the enormous increase in female labor
being drawn into the garment, shoe, and other export industries. Why did it
come about? During a Communist scare of sorts, the military played an impor-
tant role. Economic technocrats working with some of the generals persuaded
them that economic development in the rural areas was the most important
security program the military had. There was also some pressure from interna-
tional agencies, and finally there was a political concern with the new regime
wanting to establish legitimacy and to prove that they could do somewhat better
in the area. 
The other recent case was Uganda, which had hit bottom. A new regime
came in 1986. The formal economy had virtually disappeared. The vast majority
of the population was basically in subsistence agriculture, less than 13 percent in
urban areas, and within rural areas there was very little hiring of labor. A key
issue was freeing up the exchange rate, particularly as it affected farmers. There
was a decline again from about 55 percent of the population under the poverty
line in 1991 down to less than 35 percent by the year 2000. The declines were
more than proportional in rural areas. Prices to farmers went from 23 percent of
the world price to 85 percent of the world price. And the crucial part is, almost
everyone there has access to land. They have resources, so they were able to
respond to the incentives. As a result, there has been growing demand for
increasing schooling levels and improving rural transport. 
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Why did they follow the set of policies that they did? Particularly, disman-
tling some of the marketing controls was a contentious, important policy. First,
you had a new revolutionary group, and the people who benefited from the old
regime no longer had political standing; it was easy to do things so that they
would lose out, and then you could appeal to the larger population. The other
part is that international pressure was important. Uganda needed access to
external loans. Part of the quid pro quo on this was undertaking a number of
these liberalization policies that at least in this case seemed to work quite posi-
tively. Then there is a set of issues around increased participation and accounta-
bility. In Uganda, when they were stepping up funds for local schools, the
evidence is that about 15 percent was actually reaching those schools. Just pro-
viding information to various local committees as to how much had been allo-
cated for those areas would help. 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,  
Human Development, and the Pursuit of Happiness
19
S E S S I O N  F O U R
Presenter: Adil Najam 
Responder: Ralph Buultjens 
Presider: Charles Stith 
Adil Najam
The focus of my remarks will be on the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs). Every type of number that you can imagine generating around them has
been generated. The bigger question is the last question that David set for us:
What are the types of goals that we would set if we could set goals that could pos-
sibly be met? All of those are open assumptions, but one has to dream.
The UN goals are a very long enterprise. I will give a brief assessment of the
MDGs, and then revisit an old but good idea about “if you could set goals, what
would you set them about” and focus on one particular aspect of that good idea,
which is the link between national security and human insecurity. Finally, the
last question of how much it would cost, what would it take? I’d like to move
away from the cost in dollars, which many people have calculated. It’s considered
to be somewhere between $35 and 70 billion to implement the Millennium
Development Goals.
Here is a very brief primer on the Millennium Development Goals. They are
good goals, in general. The best that summits can usually do is to take what is
already there and give it the legitimacy of coming from a summit. That is not an
inconsequential thing to do. 
There are eight elements to the MDGs. The first, and probably the most
important one, is poverty and hunger. Essentially, the goal is to halve the number
of people who live on a dollar a day and halve the number of people living in
acute hunger and poverty by the year 2015. All the goals are set around 2015.
There is a conceptual theoretical base behind the goals, and in some ways they
each build on the other. The achievement of any goal actually makes the achieve-
ment of other goals easier, so they are not distinct. 
The second goal is to ensure that all girls and boys receive full primary
schooling. That is interesting, because in 1978 the UN set a goal to do exactly
that by 1990, and in 1990 to do that by 2000. The wording was slightly different,
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but the goals were generally the same. The third of the mega-categories is gender
equity. What that means in numeric targets is that female enrollment equals
male enrollment. The fourth goal concerns child mortality. The target here is to
reduce the Under-5 Mortality Rate by a third. The U-5 MR is a particularly inter-
esting target to have. If you are looking at child mortality at age five, you are now
also incorporating nutrition and health. 
The fifth of the goals is about maternal health. The primary target here is to
reduce maternal mortality by three quarters, again by 2015. For disease, the sixth
goal, the aim is to halt and reverse the incidence of HIV-AIDS and malaria and
other diseases. At first it was only HIV-AIDS, but malaria was added after a long
political fight, particularly by a number of African countries that had malaria
outbreaks going back into the early 1950s. AIDS is more frequently in the news,
but the two diseases have many similarities in the policy aspects and both also
build upon each other in many contexts, particularly in Africa, and now in Asia. 
The seventh goal is environmental sustainability. At the Johannesburg
Summit in 2002, they added a new goal to this, which was to halve the number of
people without safe drinking water. 
Then, finally, is the eighth, calling for a global partnership for development,
which is in some ways the most interesting. It is the longest in the text of the
declaration. If you note, one through seven are things that the poor are supposed
to do. The argument is essentially, “You behave and you do this. This is what your
job is for the next 15 years.” Eight says, “We’ll try to help if we can.” There is an
implied argument here, which is that they A) could not come up with this them-
selves, had we not told them about it, or B) are not interested in it themselves,
which is why we have to tell them about it. There is no money allocated for doing
this.
So how are we doing? The world would be a better place if any of these goals
were to be met. My cynicism is not about the goals. For most of the goals, most
countries are behind. Most assessments are that we won’t reach the goals, but
that this is still okay. The goals are goals and as long as we keep trying, any
progress is better, and we might actually achieve some of them a little later. And
there is the issue of needing to build momentum. This is really not a lost cause. 
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But the point I really want to talk about is that what the goals tell me about
is the poverty of imagination of our species in the year 2000. After centuries of
evolution, this is the best we can do. For the richest generation on Earth, which
has the ability to actually meet each one of those goals and beyond, the best we
can aspire to—and the UN argues that these are ambitious goals—is this. 
So let’s assume that these goals are met. What will the world look like if in
fact the assessments are wrong and we meet each one of these goals? Eight hun-
dred million people will still live on less than a dollar a day. That is, if we meet
the goals, 2.3 billion will still live on less than $2 a day. This is the good scenario.
This is the best that we, after centuries of evolution, can come up with. A billion
people will still live hungry and malnourished by WHO standards. Eight hundred
million will still live without safe drinking water. If the goals are met, we will
have at least as many and probably more people living with HIV-AIDS in 2015 as
today. This is if we meet them. I think it is less a question of faith in our ability
and more a question of our lack of desire. 
That brings us to the question: if not this, is there an alternative? That is
what I want to talk about, the good ideas. What can be done? Here is my pro-
posal: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. It wasn’t a bad idea when it was
first proposed. We have corrupted it within the last two hundred and some years.
Life translates to security. “Liberty” here means “rights.” Each one of them is
under threat, all across the world, including places where these ideas first origi-
nated. “Pursuit of happiness” means livelihoods. For most people in the world,
livelihood is what they understand. In a number of areas, including environment,
that becomes important. 
One way to think about organizing the insecurity discussion, which is differ-
ent from the security discussion, is this: people who deal with security are con-
cerned with security, and people who deal with development generally tend to be
much more concerned about insecurity. In South Asia, this is sort of a big
moment with the development of the IT industry and people from there working
all around the world. But it still remains the world’s poorest region, home to 40
percent of the world’s poor. More than 500 million people live below the poverty
line. This is what many consider to be the most vibrant region of the world and
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one of the motors of the future of the world, and this is what it looks like. It also
happens to be one of the most militarized places on Earth. That is where the
national security dilemma comes in. 
The security costs of insecurity are real. I mentioned the total cost of MDG
is estimated to be $700 million. The total expenditure on armaments in the
world is estimated to be $899 billion. So you could take 10 percent of that, which
would still leave us enough to kill every person on Earth about seven times over
by the method of his or her choice, and meet the Millennium Development Goals.
What I’m arguing here is that there are policy tradeoffs that societies make.
Want a tank? Want immunization? Make your choice. It has an impact on your
development; it has an impact on your security. 
These numbers are not out of a hat. Let me put them in context. A couple of
years ago, Pakistan bought three submarines. There is no way Pakistan is fight-
ing a sea war against anyone. It’s a simple trade-off if you’re a policy maker. We
could have gotten, for that amount, for one year, primary education for all 17 mil-
lion children who are now unenrolled, safe drinking water for all 67 million peo-
ple who don’t have clean water, and, in addition to those, family planning
services for nine million citizens. That is a very straightforward policy choice
that policy makers have to make. There is a real human insecurity cost to
national security. The total number of all Indians who have died in all military
skirmishes of any sort with Pakistan is less than the number of children who
will die in any given month in the city of New Delhi because of dirty water. It
does not matter whether the insecurity comes from the barrel of a gun or from
the end of a smokestack. 
Ralph Buultjens
I think what we have talked about and what Adil is also addressing is a very
major shift in development strategies. Today we talk about development, not sim-
ply economic growth, but all sorts of things like participation, increase in pur-
chasing power, gender. These can become the victims of fads. But there has been
some realistic expansion so that development today concerns the whole field of
human endeavor. I look upon that as a positive thing. 
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As this has expanded, so has development participation. Development was
originally financed by local investments, but today a large number of people,
institutions, and participants are involved in this. Foreign aid is a “big business.”
The military gets involved in development. That is what nation-building is sup-
posed to be. Regional institutions get involved in it. Theoretically that should
mean a much better development outcome, but the expansion and the increasing
involvement of people hasn’t produced commensurate results, and that has been
much of our discussion today. What is missing? There are the conventional
answers: there is corruption, mismanagement, and so on. But so much of this
expansion has missed the political dimension. You can change the goals; you can
expand the participants. But if you don’t change the power structure, you’re not
going very far. We had a very impressive presentation a little while ago on how
the military has been an agent of development. Is the advance of democracy one
way of changing the power structure? I’m not sure. Is some kind of international
monitoring a way of changing this? I’m not sure. 
The second question concerns delivery mechanisms. The expansion of devel-
opment objectives will not go very far unless we begin to examine delivery mech-
anisms. In many countries there is a lack of a suitable administrative cadre to
carry this out. We have seen the best intentions fall apart, and I think that is
why, in some cases, the military has been successful. They have a system to
deliver this. 
Thirdly, we have to contemplate the vast transfer of resources. The
Millennium Development Goals are like a laundry list of good intentions without
delivery mechanisms, without change in the power structure, without transfer of
resources. I think that one of the problems with these goals is that they are set
by governments. They are not set by people. We have seen examples of where
nongovernmental activity is effective. Microfinance is one. 
South Asia, with all these dreadful figures, in what is also regarded as one of
the most vibrant areas of the world, reveals the paradox of the human condition,
which is the coexistence of these things. At least we are beginning to realize the
depth of the misery and we are beginning to see some hope. When I was growing
up in that part of the world, there were people who simply believed that their
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children would grow up like them and so would their grandchildren, and so on.
Now there is some feeling that, “Well, we must send our children to school
because we want them to be a little better.” 
What can we do about the human condition? Internationalism hasn’t done
very much. Religion hasn’t done very much. Socialism hasn’t done very much.
Communism hasn’t done very much. Is capitalism the answer? What is the mech-
anism that we can use to have at least some kind of success? I would argue that
we have it already. In some ways we have had a certain amount of success.
Things on the ground have improved, but we have to find new ways and new
means of changing this and delivering this. 
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Vivien Schmidt
With Europe, it seems there simply aren’t the same problems of growth,
poverty, inequality; but there are problems of growth, inequality, and poverty.
They simply aren’t at the same level. It’s important to see that Europe is a case
study of regional development where there continue to be tremendous differ-
ences; for all the talk about convergence toward a single neo-liberal model, that
is not the case in Europe. If it is not the case in Europe, then certainly it won’t be
the case in developing countries. Institutions matter, cultures matter, interests
matter, discourse and ideas matter, and this can help explain very different
developmental patterns.
The EU is the first of the great regional states. As a matter of comparison, I
would say that the US is arguably the last of the great nation-states. The EU is
clearly not anything like a nation-state. Sovereignty is not indivisible; in the EU,
it is shared with its member states through the pooling of sovereignty. It is both
socially constructed and relational. This is because it depends upon both inter-
nal acceptance by member states, policy area by policy area, and external recog-
nition by other nation-states. There is no way that the EU is now a sovereign
region. It will be a long time before it becomes that; however, it may very well
move in that direction. 
As a regional state, we don’t know where the EU will end territorially. Will
Turkey be absorbed? If Turkey comes in, why not the Ukraine? Will the EU ulti-
mately go from Cornwall to Vladivostok? I don’t think so, but these are all open
questions. But much more important is not the issue of fixed boundaries but of
policy area. What you already see is that the EU consists of overlapping policy
boundaries. 
As a regional state, its identity is a composite in terms of culture and
nations. Only four percent of citizens put the EU as their primary identity, and
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most of them probably live in Brussels and work for the EU. The state has often,
in the past, sought to construct symbols of statehood. The EU is no different in
terms of passport, anthem, currency, but all of this is much more difficult for the
EU. The EU depends on the member states to build a sense of Europe, and
because Europe is imagined through the different lenses of national identity, it
remains very different in their projections. On top of that, there are tremendous
cultural differences across Europe, and major challenges in terms of culture and
identity that have to do with how religious minorities are accommodated within
national cultures. 
The most important question, before I switch to economics, is one of democ-
racy and legitimacy. This is a problem for Europe now. Representative politics by
and of the people is very weak in the EU because there is no directly elected gov-
ernment. Direct representation for Parliament is the weakest link. The Council
of Ministers is stronger, but it is indirect representation by member state execu-
tives. On top of that, partisan politics is submerged in the EU because of the
Council of Ministers, which is dominated by national-interest politics. 
This absence of EU-level politics is really an indirect cause of national prob-
lems of democracy. The buzzword for the past 10 years has been the “democratic
deficit” in the EU. There is discussion that if there is a constitution, the demo-
cratic deficit will be solved. In fact, that’s no way to solve the democratic deficit,
because the real democratic deficit is at the national level. People hold national
leaders accountable for policies for which they are no longer responsible, and to
which, in many cases, they are not even politically committed. The EU has effec-
tively changed the traditional workings of national democracy since the real
locus of power and authority has moved up to the EU level for increasing num-
bers of decisions, even as we have seen a significant devolution of power from
national governments to the subnational, and increases in subsidiarity. The last
thing that national leaders are going to do is say that they no longer have the
power that they used to have, though that is exactly the case. What you see
increasingly is a sort of greater instability at the national level because of the
kind of pressure that the EU puts on national politics. There is a way out, which
is to tell the truth. But that is very hard to do. 
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The more you have to engage in economic adjustment, the more the issues
of democracy come up. For the EU, what’s important is that the economy is
highly differentiated despite monetary integration. You have at least three vari-
eties of capitalism with different patterns of business, labor, and state relations.
You have three to four families of welfare states with different problems with
regard to poverty, unemployment, and sustainability.  There is no question that
globalization has made a difference. It has pushed all countries to become more
market-oriented. This doesn’t mean that they are all converging.
Strom Thacker
I want to focus on this question of the democratic deficit. What about the
credit for the good things that happen? It may be that the choice isn’t between
being impotent and being blamed, but the net effect of the whole endeavor is
viewed as being a positive one in general. And, do people not recognize where
these effects are coming from? In other words, why would they blame President
Chirac in France and not their representatives in Brussels, for example?
Looking at the issue of levels of development and the differences between
Europe and developing countries, there is the impact of democratic politics and
social policies on human development. Would social democratic policies be more
effective in developing countries or developed countries? On the one hand, these
kinds of policies are most vitally needed in developing countries. But those serv-
ices are probably the least effectively developed in those countries as well, so you
may be getting a canceling-out effect there. Looking at the level of democracy
reveals much more consistent results. For example, immunization policies and








Gandhi once said, “Do not speak unless you can improve upon the silence,”
which is good advice for many of us who are in this profession. There is a moral
imperative to speak out on some of the issues in this conference. We can’t afford
to be silent about them.
The idea of the pursuit of happiness is not a throwaway line. Two people
come to mind: Thomas Jefferson, who coined the phrase, and Aristotle. Each of
these gentlemen had something to say about this idea of happiness. Jefferson
was talking mostly about this idea that individual freedom is key to the pursuit
of happiness as he was penning the Declaration of Independence and as this
became a formative idea for the American Constitution, to allow every individual
to develop to their fullest potential. An interesting aside that occurred to me as I
was pondering this was the difference between the American creation of life, lib-
erty, and the pursuit of happiness and the French derivation of liberty, equality,
and fraternity—a very different approach.
The connection to today is to the work of Amartya Sen, who was really work-
ing in the background of many of the discussions we had today. He thinks about
development as the removal of unfreedoms. Those unfreedoms are radical
inequality and lack of access to basic needs, and the first step is the removal of
unfreedoms, an enabling of human capabilities, enabling of the fulfillment of
every person. That is a political enterprise.
Aristotle’s is a very different approach. It is a philosophical question. What
do we mean by happiness? Maybe it is better for us to think about wealth as
instrumental, wealth as a means but not an end. The first way is in looking at the
structure of the economy itself, or, as development economists would say, the
social arrangements or the institutions. Are they just? Are they fair?  There are
other agents within that system—governments, businesses, NGOs, international
institutions, and so on—that are operating within a set of arrangements. All I
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Closing Remarks
want to suggest is that from an ethical point of view or a moral point of view, we
need to be evaluating both. 
Peter Singer wrote a book called One World: The Ethics of Globalization,
making a very basic philosopher’s point that the world has been joined together
by this connection through a world economy and also through the media. This
creates a global community, and the relevant community for justice is global. We
can’t just justify our actions to our own group. Tom Friedman says the problem
with globalization is that everybody is connected, but nobody is in charge. How
do you solve a collective action problem? It has to be forward-thinking, and it has
to be understood in that way, so that some big structural changes are necessary
to make a difference. 
Charles Griswold
On the pursuit of happiness, there are a number of different levels worth dis-
cussing. One is whether the topic of happiness has any ethical import. Kant, for
example, said it depended whether you viewed in it an objectivistic way, such
that happiness as analogous to health is something that you could predicate on
yourself and be mistaken in so doing. Then there are probably two main ways to
go. One is to a tranquility theory, which says that happiness is fundamentally
tranquility. The enemy of happiness, in this view, is anxiety. I believe that this is
the kind of view that Locke and Jefferson had in mind. 
The other view is the Aristotelian view, which is active interest, and it
means something like flourishing. If you were to understand happiness along
either of those two objectivistic lines, then it has ethical content. It doesn’t fol-
low from that that it has political content. For the notion to have political con-
tent, one would want to be able to use it as a normative criterion for the success
or failure of a society. Intuitively it seems to us that there is some kind of rela-
tion between the happiness of the citizenry and the success of the society. But
classical liberals, such as Adam Smith, argue that what later came to be called
capitalism is actually based on what he called the deception of the imagination.
The illusion comes down to something very simple, which is something that
moralists have said since day one, namely, that wealth will not make you happy.
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But he goes on to say that this is a necessary and a useful illusion that nature
has imposed upon us, the endless effort to better our condition. 
There is a substandard traditional distinction between commutative justice
being something like the rules of fair play, and distributive justice, in this mod-
ern sense, having to do with the distribution of goods, whether held in private or
in public. Again, classical liberals basically tried to shift the problem of distribu-
tive justice to the market, and they did this on the basis of a theory of commuta-
tive justice, or what we would call rights and natural equality. Does that kind of
solution work or not? 
Finally, on the issue of stewardship, obviously in addition to the problem of
future generations and sustainable development, there is the problem of the
environment. As a philosopher, the central issue in environmental ethics is how
we ought to treat the nonhuman environment, both animate and not, which is an
abysmally difficult topic. If you ask yourself, what if we don’t destroy all of it,
and how much of it are we entitled to destroy, if any? The two big answers are the
utilitarian answer and the animal rights answer. I take that to be one of the most
difficult and most pressing issues facing any reflective person today. 
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